Should the US Lower Tax Rates on US Multi-National Corporations?

Should the US lower its tax rates to allow US multi-national corporations (USMNCs) to repatriate earnings allegedly re-invested offshore?

In the news, several USMNCs are lobbying the President and Congress to further lower the tax rate on repatriation of earnings allegedly re-invested in offshore operations that was proposed by the White House to be taxed at 15%.  This Reuter's Article, suggests that the USMNCs are seeking to lower the current 35% tax rate on repatriation of earnings to 3.5% tax rate on earnings already invested abroad in illiquid assets, such as factories, and 8.75% tax rate on earnings cash and liquid assets.

The Reuter's article speculates that the repatriated earnings/cash and taxes raised from the repatriated earnings/cash could raise tax revenues and funds the expansion of the US economy:  "If the $2.6 trillion overseas were repatriated at once, two things would happen.  First, Washington would get a big jolt of tax revenue.  Second, repatriated profits not collected by the Internal Revenue Service could be put to use in the economy."

The last time the US had a "tax repatriation holiday" was in 2004-2005, and the results of the tax repatriation holiday show that the alleged reinvestment into the US economy by the USMNCs that took advantage of the 5.25% lowered rate on the repatriation of earnings did not occur.  In 2001, as noted in the Reuter's article, the Senate held a hearing into the effects of the 2004 repatriation holiday and determined that the repatriation cost the US treasury at least $3.3 billion in net revenue over 10 years and produced no appreciable increase in U.S. jobs or domestic investment.  Instead, the repatriated funds were used to buy back shares and to pay executive bonuses.

Finally, the Reuter's article notes that this may be an effort of lobbyists for the USMNCs to signal the log fight ahead to achieve the new repatriation tax holiday by initially setting the percentages low, and therefore reaching a "compromise" at a slightly higher percentage.

The Reuter's article raises a fundamental question, namely: Should Congress and the President be considering passing tax reform implementing a reduced tax rate for the repatriation of earnings, or should we be looking at other ways to reform the current corporate tax "imbalance" problems, when there are no benefits (as reflected in the most recent tax repatriation holiday)?

This Bloomberg article suggests that the benefits of a tax repatriation holiday touted by USMNCs are just myths as follows:

1. The article stats by quoting Trump's economic advisor touting that the repatriation of earnings will cause a boost to the U.S. economy.  Contrast this statement with the Senate PSI findings of fact in its 2001 study on the 2004 tax repatriation holiday, where the Senate PSI determined that after repatriation over $150 billion dollars, the top 15 USMNCs actually reduced its workforce by 20,931 jobs.  Also there was no new R&D expenditure by the top 15 USMNCs that took advantage of the tax repatriation.
2. The article then states that companies have been borrowing funds in the US at historic rates and that any perceived additional tax revenues would have to be low enough to incentivize the companies to forego borrowing the money and repatriating the offshore earnings/funds.  Contrast this point with the Senate PSI findings that the repatriation holiday actually reduced tax collection by $3.3 billion over 10 years, and leads to the conclusion that a tax repatriation holiday would not generate tax revenue because the tax rate would have to be so low, and historically speaking there would be a net loss over 10 years of taxable revenue attributable to the tax holiday.
3. The article points out that the borrowed funds by USMNCs have been used for stock buy backs and executive bonuses.  Compare the use of the repatriated funds from the 2004 tax holiday which were almost exclusively used to fund stock buy backs and executive compensation with the current use of borrowed funds by the top USMNCs and this suggests that any repatriation holiday will continue this trend.
4. Finally, the article points out that clearing a supposed hurdle to the repatriation of offshore earnings (lowering the tax rate) may not incentivize USMNCs to repatriate the funds because they have operations overseas, or may continue to benefit from the sequestering of offshore earnings in lower tax jurisdiction.  Compare this myth with the Senate PSI findings that post 2004, more USMNCs increased, not decreased, their offshore earnings accumulation rate.

Both articles suggest that repatriation of offshore earnings at a lower rate for USMNCs, when coupled with the Senate PSI findings, reflect unsound US tax policy.  However, it appears as if Congress and the White House continue to buy into the myth that the USMNCs are perpetuating that a repatriation tax holiday is the remedy that will increase the US economy, generate more US tax dollars and spur economic growth.  Despite the message the USMNCs are sending, Congress and the President should look at historical data to see that the myth of a one quick fix solution (repatriation tax holiday) is a failure.

If you know of any company or individual that has sheltered funds offshore, and would like assistance in assessing and filing your IRS whistleblower claim, please CONTACT US.  The IRS Whistleblower Program pays between 15-30% if collected proceeds when the IRS proceeds based on a whistleblower's substantial and credible information.

Recent Developments

This blog will attempt to re-cap the following newsworthy stories:

1. Transfer Pricing Backlash?
2. Amazon v. IRS

Transfer Pricing Backlash?

As Previously discussed in this Blog, United States Multi-National Corporations (USMNCs) have been using transfer pricing to stash profits overseas and to avoid U.S. and State taxation.

Recently, one state treasurer is attempting to fight against the USMNCs.  In his April Newsletter, Illinois State Treasurer Michael Frerichs advocates for accountability for USMNCs that interact with his office.  Mr. Frerichs states that he is in the process of sponsoring a bill in the Illinois legislature that would prohibit companies from doing business with Illinois if it utilizes offshore accounts to avoid paying taxes.

Mr. Frerichs proposal raises several questions including:

1. Are more states willing to undertake such measures to ensure that USMNCs pay their fair share?
2. Is Illinois willing to enforce this law against companies that are based in Illinois and notorious for using foreign subsidiaries and accounts to hide profits from taxation?
3. Why isn't the federal government utilizing this method to ensure better compliance by the USMNCs?
4. Will this matte if the US lowers the corporate tax rate to permit USMNCs to bring back the amounts stashed offshore at a reduced rate?

While the answers to these questions are mere conjecture at this point, given the fact that the proposed law has not been passed to ensure compliance by USMNCs doing business with Illinois, it is still refreshing and a welcomed change of pace to the usual rhetoric of allowing USMNCs to continue to stash taxable income offshore.

Amazon v. IRS

In a recent Tax Court opinion (Amazon.com, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 148 T.C. No. 8 (2017)), the Tax Court held that IRS overstepped its authority in applying a discounted cash flow method to value a cost sharing arrangement between Amazon and its subsidiaries.

This cash involved whether Amazon properly valued an intangible it sold to its offshore subsidiary. The IRS felt that Amazon did not properly value the intangible and sought to apply the discounted cash method to value the intangible.  Why did the IRS take this approach? Simple, because it meant that Amazon would have had to recognize more income from the sale of intangible in the US and therefore would also have had to pay more taxes.

Amazon disagreed with the IRS. Amazon stated that the IRS' method violated established precedent in Veritas Software v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 14 (2009).  In Veritas, the issue before the Court was the proper buy in the subsidiary was required to pay as a result of a cost sharing arrangement.  In Veritas, the Court held that comparable uncontrolled transaction (CUT) was the proper valuation method.  Similar to Veritas, Amazon stated that the proper method utilized in its case should have been the CUT method.

The Court held in favor of Amazon.  See this synopsis of the case through the Journal of Accountancy.

Apple and the EU

Apple and the EU:  Summary of the EU's latest ruling against Apple and the EU's proposed reforms of corporate taxation.

As previously covered in this blog, the EU ruled against Ireland granting tax benefits of up to €13 billion to Apple in violation of the State aid rules.  In their law review article, "Apple State Aid Ruling: A Wrong Way to Enforce the Benefits Principle?", Professor Reuven S. Avi-Yonah (Michigan Law) and Gianluca Mazzoni (SJD Candidate, Michigan) detail how Apple was able to utilize Ireland in reducing its tax liabilities.  The most notable facts of Apple's Irish arrangement as uncovered by the article are:

• Apple's market capitalization as of October 7, 2016 was $614.61 billion dollars (or $612.66 billion as of the third quarter of 2016)
• Apple used cost sharing agreements to shift profits from U.S. Developed intangibles to its Irish subsidiaries.
  • The article briefly discusses how cost sharing agreements (as used in pharmaceutical companies) should deter transfer pricing/revenue shifting because in pharmaceutical companies it is a gamble as to whether a particular drug will be a blockbuster drug and the pharmaceutical companies would risk losing R&D costs shifted to its offshore subsidiary if the drug didn't have profits generated in the offshore subsidiary.
  • The article states that this is not the case in technology companies, like Apple, because of Apple's track record of producing blockbuster technological products.
• Apple utilized licenses of Apple's brand and intellectual property by its Irish subsidiary's (Apple Sales International, ASI's) subsidiary retail locations throughout Europe to shift royalty payments from the retail locations to ASI instead of paying taxes on the income in the European countries.
  • The article notes that the profits from other EU nations are paid to the Irish subsidiary as royalty fees for licensing Apple's logo and branding to the EU subsidiaries.

The article also discusses the reason why Apple was able to utilize its Irish structure to shield income from taxation.  The primary reason for Apple's ability to set up this structure are as follows:

• Ireland and EU's lack of withholding tax on receipts fro EU member states.
  • The article highlights that the commentary regarding EU's position to not implement a withholding tax on receipts from EU member states could create a tax haven for EU profits to be shielded from tax because the countries where the profits are earned do not impose a withholding tax on the profits leaving that country and coupling that with certain countries (Ireland and Cyprus) that do not tax money not directly earned in that country's borders allows a sophisticated company to avoid tax on profits made in EU countries.
• In 1997 U.S. adoption of Check the Box regulations.
  • The article points out that in 1997 under the direction of the U.S. Treasury and the Clinton Administration, Congress adopted the "check the box" regulations.  Check the box regulations allowed U.S. multinational corporations to treat (for US tax purposes) foreign subsidiary corporations as transparent and not separate taxable entities.  This also allowed the foreign subsidiaries to transfer royalties and interest payments between each other without generating tax (called Subpart F) on the transfers.
  • The article also makes the point that at the adoption of the check the box rules, the U.K. and Germany objected to this position because it would allow U.S. multinational corporations to utilize earnings stripping to reduce taxable income in their respective countries.  Congress at the urging of the U.S. multinational companies (namely the argument that reducing the taxable income in foreign countries would lead to larger amounts of tax paid in the U.S.) enacted the check the box regulations.
  • The article also, with the advantage of hindsight, makes the argument that the check the box regulation over time has shown that the U.K. and German objections were warranted because U.S. multinational corporations have stripped earnings from EU countries and have not resulted in more U.S. taxes paid by the sameU.S. multinational corporations.
  • The article points out that the check the box regulations created such a huge loophole (estimated $86.5 billion over a ten year period) that early on President Obama and the U.S. Treasury advocated for the reformation of the check the box regulation.  However, after intense lobbying by business associations, the Obama administration has since abandoned the check the box regulation reforms and extended the check the box regulation treatment for another 5 years.
• Exploitation of difference between Irish and U.S. tax residency rules
  • As stated in the article, Irish laws taxes corporations for only income earned in Ireland.  U.S. law taxes income earned worldwide for companies that are resident in the United States.  This creates a gap in taxation for an Irish company with income earned outside Ireland, which as the article points out was exploited by Apple by also negotiating a corporate rate of less than 2% for its Irish income.

Finally, the article discusses how the EU Commission reached its determination that Ireland provided improper state aid by granting Apple such a sweetheart deal. The article summarizes the EU Commission position as follows:

• Was there state aid provided by Ireland to Apple?
  • The EU Commission concluded yes, because a benefit was conferred on Apple, and was not conferred on all other companies.
• The article states that the EU Commission found fault with the Irish determination because it was a result of a negotiation and not merely a summary of the comparable transactions.
• The article also stated that the EU Commission questioned the methodology (Transactional Net Margin Method) chosen to determine the appropriate transfer price because the terms were not defined.
• The article then stated that the EU Commission questioned the inconsistencies in the transfer methodology selected by Apple; and
• The article stated that the EU Commission challenged the open ended duration of the ruling in Apple's favor.

Note: Apple has utilized this structure since the 1980s and as Tax Justice discusses, Apple continues to use this structure in 2016 to shield income from taxation in the U.S. based on Apple's most recent quarterly earnings report.

However, there might be a change to this structure starting in 2020, as Ireland has passed legislation in 2013, which took effect in 2015 for newly incorporated companies and in 2020 for existing companies, that in order to incorporate in Ireland the company must also be a resident of Ireland (meaning that the income received by Apple's Irish subsidiaries from its EU subsidiaries would be taxed in Ireland at 12.5%). See this Guardian article.

Additionally, the EU Commission has also proposed corporate tax reforms to address continued tax avoidance by multi-national corporations.  The EU Commission's proposals are as follows:

• Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
  • The EU Commission is proposing to treat all profits earned in EU countries as one taxable base, so that multi-national won't be taxed separately by each EU member nation.  This proposal purportedly allows a corporation to offset losses in one EU country with profits in another EU country and provides one joint tax on the profits. This proposal also attempts to address profit shifting from one EU country to another in an effort to seek a lower or advantageous tax rate.
• Improved Mechanisms to resolve double taxation disputes
  • Currently the EU has a double taxation dispute resolution only addressing transfer pricing.  This proposal by the EU Commission hopes to provide a timely response to companies seeking relief from EU members double taxing the same income in both EU member nations.
• Measures to tackle tax loopholes with non-EU countries.
  • EU Commission proposes to address tax gaps between EU nations and non-EU nations which have been exploited by companies to reduce tax.  One key example is the Irish-US tax gap implemented by Apple to avoid taxation on its EU revenues.

Whether these proposals will curb aggressive tax avoidance by multi-national corporations is questionable. But the real question is: What are Congress and the IRS/U.S. Treasury proposing to address the existing tax gap (much of which is due to U.S. multinational corporations and their profit shifting (earnings striping)/transfer pricing/base erosion/inversions practices)?

If you have specific and credible evidence of a corporation's use of transfer pricing to avoid paying its tax liabilities you should consider filing a tax whistleblower claim.  Contact us to see if your information would permit you to receive a 15-30% award of the amount of taxes, penalties and interest collected by the IRS on your transfer pricing tax whistleblower claim.